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Abstract 
In the history of Indian philosophy, dharma has been re-
evaluated and challenged multiple times by various 
schools of thought: is it is an injunction from above or one 
codified in scriptures? What happens when a scripture is 
authorless and what is then the validity of dharma? Can 
one follow dharma if it brings unfavorable results? It is in 
this context that Bhagvad Gita attempts to deal with 
dharma in a fictional context of a battle and in doing so 
raises more complex questions - it addresses the very 
paradox laying at the heart of dharma in a paradoxical 
manner. This paper looks at dharma in an ontological 
sense: the living dharma of Gita is a significant 
intervention, since Gita attempts to explain and thus 
justify the paradox of one’s being by proposing life of 
living dharma (not living a life of dharma). 
Keywords: Dharma and Gita, Ontological Paradox 
1. Introduction 
Dharma is not paradoxical in its application, its very proposition as 
a moral construction is intended to address the paradox lying at the 
crux of being. Bhagvad Gita, probably the most popular as well as 
controversial text in Indian philosophical tradition further explores 
the nuances of dharma in action; Gita, interestingly does not freeze 
life as a block of existence on earth that can be studied in isolation 
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and viewed as unchanging and stable; rather it proposes life in 
action (not life in thought) as an unstable and undefinable 
phenomenon, within which dharma is subjected to a serious 
ontological and moral inquiry; it assembles, in the context of a fluid 
state of existence called battleground where one’s life, honour and 
rights at stake. Various logical arguments used, in Indian 
philosophy thus far, to call upon dharma to answer various 
questions of moral choices and give an ontological twist to it. The 
dharma of Krishna in Gita is not the dharma of academic 
deliberations rather it is the dharma of living in the purest form; it 
is not the dharma of ‘life’ but the dharma of ‘living’ (as Heidegger 
was famous for having delineated death from dying) that Krishna 
recommends as the solution to the philosophical roadblock Arjuna 
has come upon as he looks at the vast number of relatives, family 
members and friends he is supposed to slay to achieve his ends. As 
Nagarjuna in Mulamadhyamakakarika establishes emptiness itself 
as inessential and thus one’s noticing of the inessentiality of being 
itself is inessential, Krishna in Gita puts forth the deeply 
paradoxical nature of dharma’s construction as a notion/ 
injunction/moral code by means of further more paradoxically 
poetic utterances. This had engendered many controversies, much 
misunderstanding and appropriation of Gita by various 
philosophical, political and social agencies through the history of 
India. This paper argues that this paradoxical engagement with a 
paradoxical construct is quite deliberate and it requires an 
intervention from Heideggerian concepts of da-sein and being-in-
the-world to render the arguments of Krishna in a modern 
philosophical sense.    
2. Is There One Morality to Hinduism? 
Dharma is not a unilateralal ethical code - it is “an all-embracing 
concept ... diffuse as it has many and varying meanings, ranging 
from ‘ordinance, usage, duty, right, justice, morality, virtue, 
religion, good works, function or characteristics’ to ‘norm’, 
‘righteousness’, ‘truth’ and much else” (Bilimoria, 2007, p. 37).  
Christopher Key Chapple, while erroneously claiming that 
Buddhism and Jainism as a part of the “rich tapestry of many 
traditions: some theistic, others not; some life-affirming, others 
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ascetics”, he does rightly point out the problem of Indian ethics aka 
dharma - dharma can be embedded to one’s birth status while one 
can redefine one’s dharma and its repercussions via focused action 
(Chapple, 2007, p. 351). He associates the power discourse 
embodied by the caste system with the philosophy of dharma and 
rebirth. One cannot refute who one is born as (according to 
Chapple this strand of rebirth and caste came with the Aryan 
invasion), but one can act and change one’s dharma and ensure a 
better birth next time. 
This then is the “action-oriented morality” that dharma is. Even so, 
karma and rebirth are so irretrievably intertwined, so much that 
one almost looks like the other. Karma means action. Narratives of 
karma “teaches responsibility of one’s actions” and those of rebirth 
a “continuity of action that goes beyond the boundaries of finite 
biography” (Chapple, 2007, p. 351). In popular parlance, karma is at 
times meant to be the repercussions of previous action, which in a 
way confuses rebirth with karma. But there is another word for 
“the residue left by a particular action” - samskara (352). Let us look 
into why such misassociations happen (since it is important for an 
understanding of karma). 
Action is of two kinds: afflicted (klista) and unaffflicted (aklista). The 
former causes  repeated suffering; the latter allows one to be 
liberated from repeated sufferings and frustrations (dukha) of the 
past. In either case, responsibility for one’s actions lies within 
oneself; as proclaimed in the Yogavasistha, it is indeed possible to 
overcome the negative influences of the past through concerted 
action in the present (Chapple, 2007, p. 352). 
Karma is one’s action in this life, but this life is a minuscule 
segment in an undivided continuity of temporality, which is 
rebirth. Rebirth could be metaphorical since one is supposed to act 
to liberate oneself from this continuity of temporality. If rebirth is 
not biological, is it a signifier of the being of the ever-pervading 
consciousness - the Brahman as seen by a human perceiver? No. 
This is the being of the Brahman that is unrealised yet, as it is 
reborn multitudinously. Now, your unrealised karma could be a 
continuity within an undivided stream of continuity; while 
continuity works against continuity (by discontinuity) it continues 
to go with it. Dharma, if it is “to be” in the continuity and then to 
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attempt to liberate one from it by “being” dispassionately in it, 
becomes deeply paradoxical and problematic.     
3. Non-violence, Violence and Dharma 
Jainism as well as Buddhism, parallel discourses to Hinduism, look 
at dharma in the manner of partial or full detachment from forceful 
actions (mental, physical and both as one) as an impediment to 
dharma. As per Jainism, violence is an “agitated activity ...   said to 
impair one’s innate consciousness, bliss and energy”. Jainist 
philosophy is in a sense a philosophy of the world in a 
Heideggerian sense. That is, your being in the world is accessed as 
you live in it, since the world’s being calls unto you. In Jainism, all 
things (even inanimate) possess “life force” (jiva). Chapple (2007) 
asserted, “by impairing the consciousness, energy and bliss of rocks 
and grass as well as air, water and fire bodies through acts of 
violence, karma adheres to one’s own jiva, preventing the ascent to 
pure aloneness”. This “pure aloneness” could be non-separation 
from the life, its spatial and temporal presence around us. As an 
initiation into the life of “pure aloneness”, a Jain is advised to 
practise “restraint of mind, control of tongue, carefulness on roads, 
removing things from roads, and eating in daylight” (Chapple, 
2007, p. 354). 
Buddhism advocated reverance to life and it promotes kindness to 
all living beings. This compassion is advocated not in itself but 
since it enables minimal “involvement in the world” (Chapple, 
2007, p. 355). It is a middle path of existing in the world (not 
renunciation alone) while not disturbing the order of life and non-
life (since non-living entities are not distinguishable from our 
being).  
4. Cosmic Person, Totality in Marriage with Rebirth in 
Vedic Hinduism 
Rigveda’s definition of life is in terms of a cosmic man, made up of 
“four transactional arenas, corresponding to the various tasks 
required for the operation of the world. At the top ... is Brahmin, 
the teacher and the priest. ... The next group, the Ksatriyas, are 
identified with the arms and serve as warriors and politicians. The 
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Vaisyas or merchants are associated with the thighs, the workers or 
sudras with the feet.” The use of the human body here is a signifier 
for the cosmic whole, which enables our being. This signifier later 
came to stand for reciprocity of social relationship. Bhagavad Gita is 
such a later text that extols the cosmic whole that is society itself, 
made of people playing various varying roles. In Gita, this societal 
role play provides one with a chance to disavow the ethical 
repercussions of highly unethical actions such as murder, that too 
of one’s kin and kith. The paradox here being you belong to your 
role as a killer of the enemy forces but you don’t belong to the role 
permanently and thus you haven’t sinned. Here ethics is truly 
distinguishable with dharma, as dharma, in a vein similar to that of 
Jainism, is ontological. Here detached violence is not a convenient 
mechanism proposed to wash off sin of committing a crime (Arjuna 
claims to Krishna that killing one’s kith and kin would further 
destroy the moral fabric of a ksatriya clan, it is a sin that would 
haunt him forever as well.). The paradox is already built into the 
system of Indian moral philosophy, and Bhagvad Gita merely 
employs it (not invents it), to justify action over non-action.   
According to Chapple, much later, in a societal sense caste system 
came to be justified by the signifier of the cosmic whole of a man. 
Theontological rebirth then becomes biological one, as a low born 
person could not protest since he is paying dividends to his karma 
of the previous birth. Bilimoria claims that dharma parallels 
Hegel’s idea of Sittlichkeit - an ethical behaviour, which is set in 
tradition and custom. The individual would merely imitate and 
habituate to the ethical code, which is a set of objective laws of a 
community. But in case of Indian tradition, the objective (and non-
differentiating) code of dharma came to evolve into “an overall 
form to a system of positive law and regulations of individuals and 
of groups...” (Bilimoria, 2007, p. 38). This systematic, societally 
controlling mechanism came to be the caste system (though caste 
system is not our concern here, since dharma is embroiled in 
justifications of caste, its discussion is unavoidable).       
Again Dharma is not the objective set of rules that one is obliged to 
blindly follow. A person in the third avenue of purusartha 
(dharma) could realise that he has finished observing his duties and 
move on to the fourth avenue (moksa) - a decision he takes by 
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relying on his meditative and coginitive insights. So while dharma 
is imposed as a societal code of rules, it is also determined by the 
cognitive capability of a superior person. Dharma then is to be 
obliged with as well as resisted. As Daya Krishna (2007) suggests, 
purusartha could be a signifier of no specific moral signification 
and it could be a mere myth. Dharma encapsulates this paradox, 
which is why Krishna teaches Gita to Arjuna upon whom the 
question of what dharma is as an individual dawns - should he kill 
as a Kshatriya or renunicate as a Brahmin only could? 
5. Dharma as the Paradoxical Authorless Imperative 
Jaimini in his Mimamsasutra claims dharma to be of the nature of an 
injunction. The sutra 1.1.2 defines dharma as that which is known 
by the codana sentences. Dharma is not an abstract notion in one’s 
head, it is not an instinct inciting us to act ethically, rather in more 
precise terms it is “that sentence which incites a person to act” 
(Sabara indirectly quoted by J.N. Mohanty, 2007, p. 59). As we go 
further into the nuances of the definition, an interesting paradox 
emerges. While a dharma is an injunction, not every injunction is a 
dharma. “The sentence must be valid or prama. Only the 
imperatives enjoined by the scriptures possess the unquestionable 
validity - either because their author is free from any defect or 
because they are just authorless (apaureseya)” (Mohanty, 2007, p. 
60). The injunction is supposed to carry an order from a specific 
authority, but here this authority is empowered only to be 
disempowered as he is already rendered a non-author. His 
commanding authority is valid only so far it abides by the 
scripture, but it is interesting to note that the dharma as put 
forward by the scriptures is also bound to be “authorless”. This 
standpoint does resonate with the understanding of sentence 
structure by the classical Indian grammarian Panini. According to 
him the subject of a sentence is not the primary agent, since it is not 
truly independent as we assume in, say, English grammar. 
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6. Bhagvad Gita as Negotiating Ground of Two Conflicting 
Trends 
Bhagvad Gita’s place in the history of Indian philosophy is significant 
in the sense of it addressing the central conflict of trends that 
attempt to define the agency of dharma. Until then, the will to 
perform an action was supposed to be caused by either the 
injunction from above (society, religion, the sovereign, the 
scriptures) (sabdibhavana) or the things designated by words 
(arthibhavana). The authorless theory of Mimamsa (apauruseya), the 
Bhatta theory, the concept of Vacaspati, the Nayaya theory all take 
up one of the position to define the causal efficiency of an action. 
This is quite significant in realizing one’s will to dharma and the 
very nature of dharma. For a long time, the philosophers have 
fought over this issue from two opposing camps. Badari claimed 
that one may perform a duty irrespective of whether or not it 
brings favourable results. Prabhakara later revived this view by 
considering the result as supersensible with the action itself 
supersensible in nature. That is while you follow an objective 
imperative, you also have the favorable result in mind, though this 
objective goes beyond your personal needs and goals. Thus causal 
efficiency is impersonal in a personal way and personal in an 
impersonal way. Sri Krishna in Bhagavad Gita further revived this 
paradoxical nature of dharma as he advises Arjuna to do his duty 
without considering the consequences of his action, according to 
J.N. Mohanty.      
7. Dharma of Non-dharma in Bhagvad Gita 
Bhagvad Gita begins its narrative with a vision of both the Pandava 
and Kaurava armies placed one against the other. According to the 
10th century philosopher Abhinava Gupta, the two armies signify 
awareness and lack of awareness. Pandavas, representing 
awareness, co-exist with Kauravas, signifiying the lack of 
awareness. It is important to note that awareness does not wipe 
away the other - in fact dharma can be realised with one coming to 
face the paradox of their co-existence. Arjuna comes to be the face 
of this enlightenment since he is the one who is caught the most 
between the two opposing vectors.  
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“There are two types of people in this world who are not 
suitable to receive instruction. The first are the ignorant 
ones who do not possess even the smallest knowledge. The 
second are those who have eliminated ignorance in its 
entirety. ... The best candidate for instruction is a person 
who has doubts about the topic that is going to be 
presented.” (Marjanovic, 2004, p. 30).  
It is interesting that those who have eliminated ignorance still 
cannot achieve realisation since knowledge could either make one 
abide by the internal dharma (cognitive insight) or external dharma 
(societal duties and other codes). Dharma as put forward by 
Krishna, then, is a killing of all dharmas (as Abhinava Gupta 
interprets it in terms of the term ‘dharmakshetra’ - kshetra meaning 
destruction, where ‘kshad’ the root word means ‘to kill’), which can 
only be conceptualised when you have a person in the grey space 
(Arjuna), right in the middle of the battle field, belonging neither 
here or there.        
According to Bilimoria, Bhagavad Gita resolves the traditional 
conflict between the anti-action proponents of pre-Vedic era 
(Nivrtti of ascetic) and the pro-action proponents of the social and 
moral codification of life (pravrttti of the worldly). It synthesises 
action and non-action with the discourse of niskama karma or 
disinterested action. Bilimoria observes that Gita’s role in Indian 
philosophy is to “conserve Brahmanical cultural pattern (the 
pravrtti ideal) and integrate the threatening asocial ethic of ascetic-
renunciation (the nivrtti ideal)...” (Bilimoria, 2007, p. 45). Devdutt 
Pattanaik (2015), on the other hand, believes that Gita was written 
to successfully negotiate with the rising popularity of Buddhism 
(promoting ascetism) and provide a middle path for the 
householder in the Hindu fold. What is significant is that regardless 
of the specific social function of the text it addressed the paradox at 
the heart of dharma and how it pushed the sociocultural 
boundaries with regard to nivrtti and pravrtti to redefine dharma 
at a metaphysical level. 
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8. Ambedkar on Gita: A Counter-Revolutionary 
Ambedkar is famous for his claim on Gita that “if Krishna were to 
appear as a lawyer acting for a client who is being tried for murder 
and pleaded the defence set out by him in the Bhagvat Gita there is 
not the slightest doubt that he would be sent to the lunatic asylum” 
(Kuffir, 2011). Ambedkar hits the nail on its head, doesn’t he? One 
of the major ethical problems with the Gita as moralistic 
philosophy is that it criticizes non-violence and advocates violence, 
if (of course) read literarily. Krishna claims that it is his duty as a 
kshatriya to kill and disregarding his duty would be spiritually 
debilitating. It is wrong, unethical and sinful to kill - this is not just 
a modern secular view; according to Ambedkar, most people 
influenced by Buddhism, had bid adieu to violence and had begun 
subverting the varna principle, as the shudras took up sanyas, 
inspired by Buddha. What Gita does in this context is to reinstate 
the belief in the varna system and nullify the ethical question 
hanging over acts of killing by certain communities during war - it 
releases the tension of ethical conundram by saying that killing 
could be right if called upon by Vedic edicts and, spiritually, if 
done dispassionately. This stance helped defuse the buildup of 
anti-Vedic mood in India at the time. 
To go back to the central conflicts in Gita, to kill or not seems to be 
the most important problem - Krishna builds the case of killing as a 
human construct but most of humanity has evolved to disapprove 
of killing, while the instinct to kill and destroy is alive in all of us; 
when it comes to actual killers though we expect them to repent 
later most of them need much orientation to practice repentance. 
For example, Ajmal Kasab (Dastane, Shaikh, Tanksale, Isalkar, & 
Hafeez, 2012), the 2008 Mumbai terror attack co-perpretator, who 
had jointly killed 72 civilians, was hardly repentant during 
investigation, trial and even in jail awaiting his death sentence he 
was seen singing songs (until he was seen barely muttering a 
prayer seeking forgiveness at his gallows). The 2008 murder case in 
which Abhrami, a young woman from Tamil Nadu, poisoned her 
two children to death to elope with her lover and was later arrested 
and convicted is another such instance. Let me quote from a 
newspaper report (Palani, n.d.): 
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“‘How was your mind state at that time?’ was asked by the 
lawyer to Abhirami to which she reportedly said 
‘Everything happened. I could not forget that incident. I am 
dying daily without getting sleep because of that sinful act. 
Please don‘t ask me anything more’ cried Abhirami”.  
In the statement “everything happened” she suggests that the 
murder happened in a blur, though there was elaborate planning, 
to some extent. She is guilty and repents now because the society 
condemns it, but it is almost impossible to feel something is sinful 
when you sin because sin is a construction of social injunction from 
above - sabhdibhavana. Dharma in Indian tradition is also 
considering whether an action would bring favorable results, which 
can be vaguely called arthibhavana. You could sin even when it 
favours you as an individual, though the societal codes forbid it. So 
you sin and flee, as Abhirami attempted and failed. This conflict 
between the two voices is difficult to negotiate at times, also since 
life just ‘happens’, including a sinful act. So while Abirami might 
have planned the homicide she didn’t do it because of it; action is 
quite a slippery road as most of the times we do not know why we 
act in a certain manner. Abirami would not be able to forget the 
incident since she will never truly understand her mind at the 
moment of the crime - it was a mindless moment. Though as much 
as we want to believe otherwise, life permeates boundaries of 
moral and social codes. Though murder / killing is inconvenient 
and unacceptable according to present-day legal and moral 
systems, the human phenomenon in the middle of the debate 
constantly subverts these systems. Whether right or wrong, Gita 
provides an avenue to discuss this human phenomenon, 
‘dispassionately’, as it is amoral and nonjudgemental in apprising 
human action in extremes. The very paradox of the appraisal 
emerges from the fact that it is both human to be passionate and 
dispassionate in action, while it is not humane to be so. 
Yes, Krishna could be sent to the lunatic asylum but this entire 
world is one such asylum, which means it is significant to address 
(rather than summarily dismiss) the conflict between simultaneous 
passionate and dispassionate approaches to an action and the 
problems they engender.  
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9. Gandhi‘s Gita - Dharma as Renunciation and Non-
Violence 
Gandhi makes it clear that Mahabharata (including Gita) does not 
endorse violence or warfare; in fact it shows the futility of violence, 
he claims. The violence that Krishna invokes is only metaphorical - 
it is an undetached action, not necessarily violent always (or in his 
context it is violent in an acceptable sense - he never calls for 
unwarranted killing in the Gita). Also violent action too performed 
by a yogin ceases to be so. But it is extraordinary how Gandhi 
makes peace with the amoral war endorsement of Krishna while 
recasting Gita in the warp of his ideology of non-violence, thus 
addressing the essential paradox at the heart of the treatise. For 
example, he defines action as service to humanity and says that one 
telling beads is not spiritually benefitting unless one serves people 
by means of work and there work becomes a means in itself (not 
engaging in social service so that one could see God). It is 
interesting since Gandhi is oriented towards the process that the 
result in his politics - if there is a right way of doing something he 
would follow it even if that does not yield immediate practical 
benefits. “He who gives up action falls. He who gives up only the 
reward rises. But renunciation of the fruit in no way means 
indifference to the result.” (Gandhi, 2009, p. 44). So, his action is, 
paradoxically, a counter-active action. The goal is always a 
convenient pointer for the direction the action has to take but it is 
not decider or the purpose of the action.   
Coming to violence, Gandhi can be seen resisting the claim that 
violence can be performed without attachment: “[...] according to 
the Gita, all acts that are incapable of being performed without 
attachment are taboo. ... According to this interpretation murder, 
lying, dissoluteness, and the like must be regarded as sinful and 
thereby taboo.” (Gandhi, 2009, p. 47). It is quite obvious Gandhi is 
here contesting Krishna’s claim that murder can be done without it 
being a sin, if you kill for no gain in mind. Unlike Krishna who 
claims that even extreme acts can be done with absolute 
withdrawal from the fruits of it, Gandhi believes that human 
violence always emerges from greed, fear and hatred and so it 
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always engenders attachment and thus it is a sin to kill. He says 
(Gandhi, 2009), 
“Let it be granted that, according to the letter of the Gita, it 
is possible to say that warfare is consistent with 
renunciation of fruit. But after forty years’ unremitting 
endeavor fully to enforce the teaching of the Gita in my own 
life, I have, in all humility, felt that perfect renunciation is 
impossible without perfect observation of ahimsa in every 
shape and form.” (Gandhi, 2009, p. 52) 
10. Heidegger and the Nishkamakarma of Krishna 
The seemingly irresolvable puzzle of the idea of selfless but still 
self-oriented, super-social but still socially bound duty proposed in 
Bhagvad Gita could be unravelled, to some extent, via the theory of 
da-sein and being-in-the-world by Martin Heidegger. For that 
purpose let me briefly put across what Heidegger means by these 
two concepts: 
10.1 Da-sein and Being-in-the-World 
(A) Da-sein is a literal translation is ’being-there‘. According to 
Heidegger, it is ”an anticipatory drive- towards-Being, thrown-as-
yet-to-be-realized (in-the-world) with beings (it encounters in the 
world).” “Da” (there) is important ”here”. There means the ”world”. 
The “world” in Heidegger means the non-binary physicality of our 
existence with the world (The world in quotes is the world you are 
not separate from at the time you drive towards it; it is the world of 
your being). One cannot have the being realized without the 
physicality that trails, sets around, and in which we exist; There-
being is also time blending into the world. It is a spatiotemporal 
existence, to put it in simple terms. For, example, ”a girl eating a 
banana on her way to a bus stop” is in the ”da”, the ”there” (on her 
way to...). But this ”there” could exist because the girl is ”there”; the 
girl is ”there” because she ”is” there – the time is important ”here”. 
And the time is not just realized in the verb ”is” – it is realizing in 
”eating”, not just eating but eating a ”banana”, which places her in 
her world, in her time, one within the other in such a way that it 
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becomes ”one-within-the-other”, and the girl is ”girl-eating-a-
banana-on-her-way-to-the-bus-stop”. 
(B) Being-in-the-world means dealing with the world, as we 
understand the latter in Heideggerian terms. Every moment a 
person is situated in the time and space of this world he or she is 
accessing his da-sein. It begins with a baby, just delivered, screams 
out after breathing in the air of the world. It’s scream is its being-in-
the-world, when only the baby, its bed or cradle, its first few 
moments of life (its temporality in the world) exist, and it is 
exulting at the prospect of its da-stein. Krishna in Bhagvad Gita 
wants Arjuna to realise that his “world” is the battlefield (and 
nothing else), like the cradle is for the baby, and his scream is the 
volley of arrows he would shoot at his enemies. He is not and he 
won’t be separate from his arm that holds the bow, the bow that 
shoots the arrow, the air that carries it swiftly across, the body that 
is the target, the immense pain of the victim, the blood that surges 
in the archer’s vein and that simultaneously spews out of the 
victim’s wound are all fused together in one time and space, and 
that is the realisation of Atman in one’s day-to-day existence, be it 
the killer or the killed. Arjuna’s duty is to realise this oneness again 
and again in almost detached state, and his battle cry will then be 
no different from the first scream of a newborn-in-the-world. 
Yes the conflict still exists and the paradox of existence continues 
but only outside of one’s existence. Yes it is scary and shocking to 
equate birth with death, but that is what Krishna repeatedly does in 
Chapter 2 of Bhagvad Gita. The shock derives not even from the 
equanimity of these two extremes but the laying bare of the inner 
paradox of considering the opposites in one context.  
11. The Question of the Mortification of Death in 
Nishkamakarma 
J.N. Mohanty (2007) raises a question in terms of whether it is right 
to place dharma above the what it entails in reality - the contents of 
an act of dharma. In case of Bhagvad Gita it is death. Is “the 
domain of values ... structured like a pyramid with a higher [goal] 
at the top”? (Mohanty, 2007, p. 67) Since Mohanty approaches it 
from Kantian and Hegelian moral concepts the hierarchy and over 
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abstractification appears to be a prominent fault of the model. But 
seen ontologically, one realises that the contents of an action is not 
to be separated and seen as a component. Once you are in da-sein 
the components cease to exist and even the world isn’t a mere space 
to hold you in, but you are in-the-world-doing-something-in-time. 
Here the hierarchy of placing a higher good as a purpose of the 
dharmic action above all doesn’t happen. There is no hierarchy in 
Heidegger’s “world”. Death too then is not mortifying in itself, but 
it can be so in the world. It is the mortification-of-the-body-in-the-
world and one does not take mortification apart and question it as 
the da-sein is what keeps drawing you in the world not piecemeal 
analysis of life.   
To conclude, it is important to state that no reading of Gita can be 
expected to make it rational, humanistic or progressive since as a 
text engaging with the highly paradoxical entity in India moral 
philosophy called dharma it attempts a radical position by using 
highly paradoxical and poetic utterances that defer meaning once 
uttered and defy it too. Using paradox as a tool to engage with the 
very paradox of dharma in a state of not life but of living Krishna 
shows it promotes the most vigorous form of being-in-the-world 
while also remaining ethically feasible to the given  context. By 
staying detached in living one realises da-sein as well as meets 
ethical standards. Again, by choosing living over the 
”technological” form of it called life Krishna further complicates the 
many ways of performing dharma. One can say that Krishna here 
truly lives up to his reputation as not just a problem solver and a 
smart negotiator of differences but also a trouble maker.  
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